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By Robert C. Bird  and Daniel R. Cahoy* **
¶1 In 2003, two economists at Goldman Sachs produced a white paper predicting the 
economic growth of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, collectively termed the BRIC 
economies.1  This paper offered projections from the present date to 2050 relative to 
similar growth projections of the G6 countries.2  Applying capital accumulation and 
productivity growth to demographic trends, the authors discovered a surprising result.  
Each of the BRIC economics may exceed the gross domestic product (GDP) of the 
current members of the G6 within 40 years.3  China’s economy in size may overtake 
those of Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom within ten years.4  India's may do the 
same within 30 years.5  If the study proves correct, Germany, France, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom may all be forced out of the elite G6 club by 2050, leaving only the 
United States and Japan remaining within the largest six economies in the world.  6
¶2 The Goldman Sachs study should capture the attention of anyone interested in 
emerging economies.  Although it may not be surprising to everyone that the BRICs will 
emerge as economic contenders, what may be unexpected is the rapidity and the totality 
with which economic dominance may be achieved.  The world that our students live in 
now is not the one in which they will grow old, and the United States may stand alone, if 
it stands at all, as the sole Western economic leader. 
¶3 There are of course lies, damn lies, and statistics,7 and economics has been 
frequently and perhaps unjustly painted as the “dismal science.”   Any accounting of the 8
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** Associate Professor of Business Law, Smeal College of Business, the Pennsylvania State University. 
1 Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050 (Goldman Sachs, 
Global Economics Paper No. 99, 2003), available at http://www.gs.com/insight/research/reports/99.pdf. 
2 Id. at 3. The G6 preceded the G8 as a ‘club of wealthy nations.’  The United States, Japan, Germany, 
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom are generally considered to be the G6 members.  For more 
information on the G8, which includes the G6 plus Canada and Russia, see Profile: G8, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/country_profiles/3777557.stm; G8 Information Centre, 
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/. 
3 Wilson & Purushothaman, supra note 1, at 4. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 4. 
7 Quote... Unquote, The Most Quoted Remarks, http:// www1c.btwebworld.com/quote-
unquote/p0000149.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2006) (quoting, MARK TWAIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1924)). 
Twain gives credit for the quote to Disraeli. Id. 
8 E.g., Mark D. Whitener, Editor’s Note: The Dismal Science, 20 ANTITRUST 6, 6 (2006); David A. 
Westbrook, Commentary, Triptych: Three Meditations on How Law Rules After Globalization, 12 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 337, 374 (2003) (“Economics has long been called the ‘dismal science’ for a reason.”); 
CHARLES WHELAN, NAKED ECONOMICS: UNDRESSING THE DISMAL SCIENCE (2002). But see Alan 
 
Vol. 5:3] Robert C. Bird and Daniel R. Cahoy 
Goldman Sachs paper must be done with caution.  The authors rightly note that 
demographic shifts, changing investment rates, and different convergence rates can 
change the results of the study.9  Regional economic shocks, political unrest, and a 
stalling of needed reforms can derail one or all four of the BRICs from the lofty 
attainments of 2050. 
¶4 Yet far from dismal, Wilson & Purushothaman’s paper is fundamentally optimistic, 
at least from the perspective of the BRIC nations.  Rigorous quantitative work such as 
theirs is badly needed in a profession traditionally focused on qualitative reasoning and 
argumentation.10  Furthermore, few legal articles focus on the BRICs as a collectively 
emerging economic force.11  A 2005 conference held at the University of Connecticut 
studying the BRIC economies produced a compendium of BRIC-focused articles written 
largely by economists and business faculty.12 Just as this program thoughtfully explored 
the BRICs from a firm perspective, so too should the forward thinking symposium 
sponsored by the Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, of which 
the articles in this issue are a consequence, similarly illuminate legal issues. 
¶5 Scholarly machinations aside, the question remains of how scholars should view 
the BRIC juggernaut.  The BRIC economies are potentially a political and economic 
force emerging to unseat Western economic hegemony.  On the other hand, the BRICs 
may be little more than a collection of disparate nations that share common 
characteristics of growth and emergence by chance rather than by design.  The answer 
likely lies somewhere between these two extremes and legal scholars can help find the 
way. 
¶6 This article briefly examines the converging and diverging economic and legal 
trends of the BRICs from an intellectual property perspective.  Part I of this article 
explores the macroeconomic converging and diverging forces of BRICs, such as growth 
opportunities and constraints, transformations and challenges, as well as outward and 
inward foreign direct investment.  This section will take a particular focus on intellectual 
property laws and enforcement as emblematic of the challenges experienced by emerging 
BRICs.  Part II amplifies the focus on intellectual property with an examination of one of 
the most controversial current intellectual property topics–that of pharmaceutical patent 
 
Krupnick, Colloguium, Economic Analysis, 16 PACE ENVT’L L. REV. 69, 69 (1998) (contrasting the notion 
of economics as a dismal science, the author writes, “I think of economics as a happy science.”). 
9 Wilson & Purushothaman, supra note 1, at 4. 
10 See, e.g., Tracy E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law 
Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 141 (2006) (“[Empirical research] was uncommon in law schools through most 
of the last century.”).  See also Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue 
Between the Academy and the Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 362 (1995) (reporting results of a 
telephone survey of 40 law professors selected at random from 20 schools that nearly 90% thought a “lack 
or shortage of empirical research in legal scholarship” existed). 
11 Exceptions to this rule predating this symposium are, for example, Robert C. Bird, Defending 
Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317 (2006); Michael Littlewood, Tax 
Competition: Harmful to Whom?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 411, 478 n.278 (2004) and Srividhya Ragavan, The 
Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The Supreme Court in Phrma v. Walsh and the TRIPS 
Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 777, 824 n.279 (2004). 
12 EMERGING ECONOMIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: BRAZIL, RUSSIA, 
INDIA AND CHINA (BRICS) (Subhash C. Jain ed. 2003).  The conference and the publication by Elgar Press 
was hosted and sponsored by the University of Connecticut’s Center for International Business Education 
and Research (CIBER), a program funded by the U.S. Department of Education. Id. at v, xv.  Other 
CIBERs at Columbia University, University of Memphis, Thunderbird, the Galvin School of Management, 
and the University of Wisconsin co-sponsored the event. Id. at xiii. 
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rights. This section will examine the compulsory licensing statutes and practices of each 
BRIC member and draw conclusions from these activities about the differing approaches 
of emerging nations to heretofore unfamiliar legal structures and obligations. 
I. THE ASCENDANCY OF THE BRICS: 
PHYSICAL AND INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL GROWTH AND CHALLENGES 
¶7 The BRIC nations emerge from radically different economic and political histories.  
Brazil obtained independence from Portugal in 1822 and experienced a surge of 
industrialization through much of the twentieth century.  In spite of the oil shocks of the 
1970s, Brazil’s GDP expanded 8% on average from 1970 to 1980.  In the 1980s, Brazil 
suffered from low commodity prices, inflationary pressures, and high interest rates while 
at the same time making the transition from long-standing military intervention in 
governance to mainly civilian leadership.  The 1990s and 2000s were marked with widely 
fluctuating growth rates, a depreciated currency, and poor administrative reforms.  13
¶8 Russia, by contrast, emerged from the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 
with little history of democratic governance and legal free markets.  Russian leaders 
dismantled the centrally planned economy and distributed ownership of state enterprises 
to managers and other citizens.  Private property ownership in Russia brought abuses 
through dubious loans-for-shares schemes in which powerful citizens “purchased” state 
assets from government officials in rigged auctions.  The result was the emergence of a 
cadre of oligarchs who controlled most of Russia’s most valuable natural resources and 
industrial assets.  14
¶9 Achieving independence in 1947, India has existed under democratic government 
for centuries.  In spite of a diverse economy, India has suffered from a command and 
control planning system that has generated large bureaucratic governments, inefficient 
production and distribution methods, and a stifling restriction on imports.  This policy, 
known as the “license raj,”15 resulted in India’s share of international trade declining 
from 2.5% in 1947 to 0.5% in 1980.  Weak returns on investments in large, capital-
intensive projects arising from delay and cost overruns also contributed to India’s 
economic malaise.16  Increased borrowing and rapid overpopulation has resulted in an 
economy poised for growth, but as of yet unable to completely unshackle itself from the 
remnants of government planning.  17
¶10 Finally, China has attempted to weave together the economic benefits of a market 
economy with the government social and political control of socialism.  Forged in 1949, 
 
13 Ben L. Kedia, Somnath Lahiri & Debmalya Mukherjee, BRIC Economies: Earlier Growth 
Constraints, Contemporary Transformations and Future Potential, and Key Challenges, 47-48, in 
EMERGING ECONOMIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: BRAZIL, RUSSIA, INDIA 
AND CHINA (BRICS) (Subhash C. Jain ed. 2003).  See also Diane M. Sweetwood, Is Brazil’s Economy 
Coming Back to Life?, 10 MULTINAT’L BUS. REV. 54 (2002). 
14 Daniel J. McCarthy & Sheila M. Puffer, The Tortuous Trail Toward Corporate Governance in Russia 
218-220, in EMERGING ECONOMIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: BRAZIL, 
RUSSIA, INDIA AND CHINA (BRICS) (Subhash C. Jain ed. 2003). 
15 E.g., Sumit K. Majumdar, The Hidden Hand and the License Raj to an Evaluation of the Relationship 
between the Age and the Growth of Firms in India, 19 J. BUS. VENTURING 107 (2004). 
16 Jagdish N. Sheth, Making India Globally Competitive, 29 VIKALPA: THE JOURNAL FOR DECISION 
MAKERS 1 (2004). 
17 Kedia et al., supra note 13, at 51-52. 
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the People’s Republic of China has suffered from repeated attempts to jumpstart its 
economy.  One of the most disastrous was Mao Zedong’s “Great Leap Forward,” a 
program of collectivization of agriculture and promotion of small-scale rural industry 
that, after initial success, wilted into an economic disaster.  Forced production quotas 
resulted in goods produced, such as steel, that were useless for market consumption.18  
Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, brought economic reforms by opening China's large 
market to foreign investment.19  Today, China uneasily blends socialist governance and 
market planning while continuing its efforts at economic reform. 
¶11 In spite of vastly different political histories, the BRIC treatment of intellectual 
property law and enforcement are all unsatisfactory, at least by American and perhaps 
European standards.  All four BRICs have been subjected to coercive pressure from the 
United States.  The way each nation has responded, however, is as different as the 
histories of the nations themselves. 
¶12 During the 1980s and at least as far back as 1971, Brazil’s intellectual property law 
lacked patent protection for pharmaceutical products and processes.20  The 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association (PMA) claimed that Brazil’s weak laws 
devalued their investments, impaired exports, and denied opportunities for further 
investment in Brazil.21  Claiming hundreds of millions of dollars in losses, the PMA 
chose the coercive route, seeking relief under Section 301  of the Trade Act of 1974.22 23  
Section 301 and its subsequent enhancements give the President authority to impose 
retaliatory sanctions against a nation that engages in unfair trade practices.24  Pursuant to 
the Act, the PMA filed a petition in 1987 with the United States Trade Representative 
 
18 Id. at 52-53. 
19 Anne M. Wall, Intellectual Property Protection in China: Enforcing Trademark Rights, 17 MARQ. 
SPORTS L. REV. 341, 349-51 (2006).  Deng’s pragmatism toward economics is captured in his widely-cited 
quote from the 1960s, “Whether a cat is black or white makes no difference. As long as it catches mice, it is 
a good cat.” H. Stephen Harris, Jr., The Making of an Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti-Monopoly Law of 
the People’s Republic of China, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 169, 172 (2006). 
20 Naomi A. Bass, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries: Pharmaceutical 
Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 191, 206-07 
(2002). 
21 Mohamed Omar Gad, Impact of Multinational Enterprises on Multilateral Rulemaking: The 
Pharmaceutical Industry and the TRIPS Uruguay Round Negotiations, 9 NAFTA L. & BUS. REV. AM. 667, 
674 (2003). 
22 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2007).   
23 The stated  purposes of the 1974 Trade Act are: 
 
(1) to foster the economic growth of and full employment in the United States and to strengthen economic 
relations between the United States and foreign countries through open and nondiscriminatory world trade; 
(2) to harmonize, reduce, and eliminate barriers to trade on a basis which assures substantially equivalent 
competitive opportunities for the commerce of the United States; 
(3) to establish fairness and equity in international trading relations, including reform of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade; 
(4) to provide adequate procedures to safeguard American industry and labor against unfair or injurious import 
competition, and to assist industries, firm, workers, and communities to adjust to changes in international trade flows; 
(5) to open up market opportunities for United States commerce in nonmarket economies; and 
(6) to provide fair and reasonable access to products of less developed countries in the United States market. 
 
19 U.S.C. § 2102 (2007). 
24 See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-
First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 139 n.37 (2000). 
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(USTR), which is required to review whether a foreign country practice constitutes a 
barrier to U.S. exports.25  In 1988, President Reagan placed a 100% tariff on $39 million 
dollars worth of Brazilian imports to the United States.26  Only when the Brazilian 
government announced that it would draft legislation protecting pharmaceutical products 
and processes and that it would ensure a bill would be presented to the Brazilian National 
Congress by March 20, 1991, did the U.S. government lift the sanctions.  27
¶13 Russia has also experienced U.S. pressure.  In 1995, the USTR placed Russia on its 
Watch List in 1995 and then elevated Russia to its Priority Watch List in 1997.28  While 
the U.S. government encouraged Russia to join the Berne Convention in exchange for 
preferential trade status, the motion picture industry lobbied the U.S. Congress to 
withhold ratification until Russia improved its copyright laws.29  In November 2006, 
Russian and American trade representatives signed a “Side Letter” formally known as the 
U.S.-Russia Bilateral Market Access Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights.30  This 
letter was negotiated in the context of Russia’s continuing efforts to accede to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).31 The letter establishes a binding blueprint for Russia to 
improve intellectual property enforcement, strengthen various laws, and fully implement 
the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).32  Cited 
by the International Intellectual Property Association (IIPA) as having the worst 
copyright piracy problem in the world,33 Russia remains on the USTR’s Priority Watch 
List.34 The IIPA watchdog group recommended earlier this year that Russia remain there 
until meaningful progress on intellectual property develops.35  Furthermore, Russia is a 
major beneficiary of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, 
designed to promote the economies of developing countries through the allowance of 
 
25 Id. at 139. 
26 Bass, supra note 20, at 207.  Mohamed Omar Gad reports the amount at $40 million. Gad, supra note 
21, at 684. 
27 Determination to Terminate Increased Duties on Certain Articles from Brazil, 55 Fed. Reg. 27,324 
(July 2, 1990). 
28 Connie Neigel, Piracy in Russia and China: A Different U.S. Reaction, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
179, 188 (2000).  See also Tim Kuik, Piracy in Russia: An Epidemic, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 831 (1999). See 
Lianlian Lin, Intellectual Property Protection in China, 27 ACAD. LEGAL STUD. BUS. NAT’L PROC. 203, 
205 (1998) (“[The] USTR prepares a list of countries, ranked from ‘priority foreign country,’ a country 
with the most egregious IPR problems, to ‘priority watch list,’ and to ‘watch list,’ a country that still 
warrant [sic] monitoring.”). 
29 Bird, supra note 11, at 328.  See also Lana C. Fleishman, The Empire Strikes Back: The Influence of 
the United States Motion Picture Industry on Russian Copyright Law, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 189, 215-22 
(1993). 
30 International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2007 Special 301 Report (Russian Federation), at 
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2007/2007SPEC301RUSSIA.pdf. at 115 n.2. [hereinafter IIPA 2007 Russia] 
31 Russia is not currently a member of the WTO, having merely observer status.  Brigitte Binkert, Why 
the Current Global Intellectual Property Framework under TRIPS is not Working, 10 INTELL. PROP. L. 
BULL. 143, 162 (2006).  For more information in Russia’s efforts to join the WTO, see Accessions: Russian 
Federation, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm. 
32 U.S.-Russia Bilateral Market Access Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights, 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/World_Regions/Europe_Middle_East/Russia_the_NIS/asset_upload_file148_10
011.pdf. 
33 IIPA 2007 Russia, supra note 30, at 115. 
34 United States Trade Representative, 2007 Priority Watch List, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2007/2007_Special_301_Review/asse
t_upload_file884_11123.pdf. [hereinafter USTR 2007 Priority Watch List] 
35 IIPA 2007 Russia, supra note 30, at 115. 
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duty-free products.36  Russia received GSP-linked trade benefits worth $429.8 billion in 
2003.37  The IIPA has recommended that the USTR suspend GSP benefits for Russia, and 
the USTR remarked in its 2007 Priority Watch List38 document that the U.S is “reviewing 
Russia’s status as a beneficiary country under the U.S. Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) Program.”  39
¶14 India led the charge against intermixing intellectual property and trade rights in the 
1980s, refusing to even discuss the possibility of including patent protection in a General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade agreement (GATT).40  India’s resistance ended in 1989, 
during the same period when India depleted its foreign currency reserves due to an 
economic crisis.41  India sought badly needed assistance from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), an entity heavily influenced by the United States.42  As a result of its IMF 
needs and other potential trade losses with the United States, India ultimately relaxed its 
opposition to the TRIPS agreement, a major result of GATT, and acceded to its 
provisions.43  U.S.-based pressure towards India did not end even after it agreed to follow 
the obligations of TRIPS.  When the Indian government delayed in enacting enabling 
legislation, the United States sought redress through the WTO, which can ultimately 
authorize trade sanctions by one country against another, to compel India to amend its 
insufficiently strong patent legislation.44 In 2000, pharmaceutical representatives 
demanded that the USTR place India on its Priority Watch List.  As of 2007, India 
remains on the USTR’s Priority Watch List, cited for weak copyright laws, inadequate 
enforcement, and slow judicial resolution of criminal actions.  45
¶15 The United States repeatedly has threatened China with economic sanctions for its 
failure to protect intellectual property rights.  After a 1979 agreement to treat one 
another’s patents and trademarks equally failed to protect U.S. intellectual property 
rights,  the USTR placed China on its first Priority Watch List in 1989.46 47  During the 
1990s, China would respond to U.S. pressure by enacting ever stronger intellectual 
property laws.  When U.S. firms found these laws or their enforcement unsatisfying, they 
 
36 Michael Mertens, Thieves in Cyberspace: Examining Music Piracy and Copyright Law Deficiencies 
in Russia as it Enters the Digital Age, 14 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 139, 179 n.308 (2006) 
(describing GSP program).  See also United States Trade Representative: Generalized System of 
Preferences, at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Development/Preference_Programs/GSP/Section_Index.html. 
37 Mertens, supra note 36, at 180. 
38 IIPA 2007 Russia, supra note 30, at 115. 
39 USTR 2007 Priority Watch List, supra note 34, at 8.  See also Mertens, supra note 36, at 180 
(recommending that “[t]he United States should immediately suspend Russia's GSP benefits until the 
country recognizes the online piracy problem and enforces copyright protection to the extent that a 
noticeable reduction in piracy results.”). 
40 C. O’Neal Taylor, Linkage and Rule-Making: Observations on Trade and Investment and Trade and 
Labor, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 639, 668 n.114 (1998). 
41 George K. Foster, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International Patent Protection: The U.S. and 
India in the Uruguay Round and its Aftermath, 3 UCLA J. INT’L & FOREIGN AFF. 283, 316 (1998).    
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 317. 
44 Bird, supra note 11, at 345. 
45 USTR 2007 Priority Watch List, supra note 34, at 10.   
46 Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of 
China of 1979, July 7, 1979, P.R.C.-U.S., 31 U.S.T. 4652. 
47 David Hindman, The Effect of Intellectual Property Regimes on Foreign Investments in Developing 
Countries, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 467, 485 (2006). 
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would lobby the U.S. government to impose sanctions.48  A last minute compromise 
between American and Chinese negotiators would avert a trade war and satisfy public 
opinion.  But, as interest in piracy inevitably waned after the highly publicized 
agreement, American companies in China sensitive to intellectual property concerns 
would again demand assistance from the government to aid them in protecting their 
intellectual property rights abroad.49  The result has been a frustrating “China Cycle” of 
negotiation, agreement, and renegotiation that has continued for over a decade.50  As of 
2007, China remains on the USTR’s Priority Watch List.  51
¶16 In spite of current problems, the United States has succeeded at least in part in 
improving the protection of intellectual property rights in the BRICs over the past 20 
years.  All four BRICs relented somewhat under U.S. pressure to pass new laws and 
improve enforcement.  The BRICs, however, are not simply compliant states.  Each 
BRIC nation has developed its own successful strategy for resisting the unfettered will of 
the United States. 
¶17 Of the four BRICs, Brazil has been by far the most masterful in counteracting the 
economic and political influence of the United States over global intellectual property 
law.  In 1997, Brazil enacted new legislation that included a “local working” requirement 
which subjects a patent owner to potential compulsory licensing within three years after 
the patent is granted if, among other reasons, the patent owner fails to manufacture the 
product within Brazilian territory.52  The new law lowered production costs on critical 
drugs due to the increased local production.53  The law also improved Brazil’s ability to 
develop local manufacturing capacity and expertise to certain manufacture drugs once 
their patents have expired.  54
¶18 The American pharmaceutical industry responded by predicting that Brazil’s 
actions would undermine efforts to develop new and improved treatments for important 
public health problems such as suppression of the HIV virus.55  If the Brazilian 
government issued a compulsory license breaking these critical patents, the industry said 
it will “ensure that companies whose patents are broken will not be selling their next 
generation AIDS drugs, or any other medication for that matter, in Brazil.”56  The United 
States also responded bringing a complaint against Brazil before the WTO, arguing that 
Article 68 contravened Article 27(1) of TRIPS, which prohibits national patent protection 
laws from discriminating with regard to the locale of invention.   According to the 57
 
48 Bird, supra note 11, at 342. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. See also Yu, supra 24, at 134-35. 
51 USTR 2007 Priority Watch List, supra note 34, at 1-6. 
52 Id.  The patent owner will be allowed to import the drug if the owner can show “economic 
unfeasibility” of manufacturing the medicine in Brazil. Id. 
53 Ubirajara Regis Quintanilha Marques et al., Brazil’s AIDS Controversy: Antiretroviral Drugs, 
Breaking Patents, and Compulsory Licensing, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 471, 474 (2005). 
54 Claudia Schulz, The TRIPS Agreement and Intellectual Property in Brazil, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 
PROC. 100, 101 (2004).  The Article has been credited with reducing prices of key anti-retroviral AIDS 
drugs Efavirenz and Indinavir by 64% and 77%, respectively. Carlos Passarelli & Veriano Terto, Jr., Good 
Medicine: Brazil’s Multifront war on AIDS, 35 NACLA REP. ON AMERICAS 35, 37 (2002). 
55 Marques, supra note 53, at 476. 
56 Id. (quoting Institute for Policy Innovation, Necessity Breeds Invention (Protection), Techbytes 2.14 
(Apr. 15, 2005), available at http://www.iipi.org). 
57 WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Brazil--Measure Affecting Patent Protection--Request for 
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USTR’s Special 301 report in 2001, Brazil’s claim that impairment of Article 68 would 
threaten its anti-AIDS program was inaccurate because Brazilian law already allowed for 
compulsory licenses for national emergencies, such as AIDS-prevention under Article 
71.58  The USTR called Article 68 a hidden trade barrier because it could require 
licensing “for any patented product, from bicycles to automobile components to golf 
clubs . . . [and is] discriminating against all imported products in favor of locally 
produced products.”59  The USTR further characterized Article 68 “a protectionist 
measure intended to create jobs for Brazilian nationals.”  60
¶19 Instead of quietly defending Article 68 on the merits before the WTO, Brazil pled 
its case before the court of public opinion.  Although Article 68 granted a compulsory 
license to any good regardless of social importance, Brazil tied Article 68 to the deeply 
controversial AIDS debate raging between developing countries and pharmaceutical 
enterprises.  During this period, 39 pharmaceutical firms were suing the South African 
government to stop it from importing generic versions of anti-retroviral drugs that were 
patented in South Africa.61  The ill-targeted lawsuit, which triggered a proliferation of 
global activism and significant damage to public opinion, was filed against a nation 
where 20% of South Africa's adult population, or 4.2 million people, were believed to be 
infected with the HIV virus.62  Brazil used South Africa as a comparison point to parade 
its highly successful anti-AIDS program, implying that this program would be in 
jeopardy if the United States succeeded before the WTO.63  AIDS activists and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) accused the U.S. government of profiting at the 
expense of infected Brazilians and commenced a signature campaign.64  Brazil hosted a 
global meeting of NGO representatives and organized a march on the U.S. consulate to 
protest the complaint, with similar demonstrations occurring in other Brazilian cities.65  
Brazil successfully lobbied for a United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
resolution affirming the right of access to medication.66  The United States was the sole 
abstention of the 53 member body, every member of which voted to pass the resolution.  67
¶20 Not satisfied with what one commentator called a “public relations disaster”68 for 
the United States, Brazil went on the offensive by filing its own complaint before the 
WTO challenging portions of the U.S. patent code as non-compliant with TRIPS.   69
 
Consultations by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000). 
58 United States Trade Representative, 2000 Special 301 Report, available at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/ustr/special301.pdf. [hereinafter 2001 Special 301 Report] 
59 Id. See also Haochen Sun, The Road to Doha and Beyond: Some Reflections on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 123, 132-33 (2004). 
60 2001 Special 301 Report, supra note 34. 
61 Passarelli & Terto, supra note 54 at 41. 
62 Sabin Russell, AIDS Experts to Meet in Eye of Epidemic/20% of South Africa’s Adults are Infected, 
S.F. CHRON., Jul. 7, 2000, available at, http://www.aegis.com/news/sc/2000/SC000701.html.  
63 Anselm Kamperman Sanders, The Development Agenda for Intellectual Property: Rational Human 
Policy or “Modern-Day Communism”?, lecture presented at Universiteit Maastricht (May 20, 2005), 
available at http://www.unimaas.nl/bestand.asp?id=3827, at 16.  See also Marques, supra note __, at 471. 
64 Chakravarthi Raghavan, US beats a (tactical) retreat over Brazil’s patent law, THIRD WORLD 
NETWORK, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/tactical.htm. 
65 Passarelli & Terto, supra note 54, at 41-42. 
66 Sanders, supra note 63, at 16. 
67 Id. 
68 Raghavan, supra note 64. 
69 Sue Ann Mota, TRIPS: Ten Years of Disputes at the WTO, 9 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. 455, 477 
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Brazil challenged 30 U.S.C § 202, which stated that products arising from small business 
or non-profit patent rights in inventions made with federal assistance shall be made 
substantially in the United States.70  This provision also stated that licenses arising from 
federally-owned inventions shall be manufactured in the United States.71  India even 
joined the fray, claiming that it had a “systemic interest” in the proceeding.72  The 
combined pressure from Brazilian leadership, Brazil’s reprisal WTO action, and NGOs 
forced the United Sates to withdraw its original complaint from the WTO.  73
¶21 Russia, by contrast, does not press its advantage in the court of public opinion, but 
rather, resists United States pressure because of its unique political position as a nuclear 
nation, member of the U.N. Security Council, and a former superpower.  In the past, 
Russia’s lack of intellectual property protection had been dealt with relatively leniently 
by the United States as compared to Brazil, India, and China.  This may be due to the 
unique position that Russia held during the 1990s.   In the post-Soviet era, the United 
States emerged as a strong supporter of the Yeltsin government.74  Government officials 
speculated that pressing Russia for stronger intellectual property protection would 
unnecessarily push the Russian government back towards strong state controls if its 
economy faltered.75  In addition, Russia has never been traditionally viewed as the 
enormous consumer market that has attracted businesspeople to China, India, and to a 
lesser extent, Brazil.76  Most recently, Russia has played a key role in the global political 
arena on such controversial issues as the U.S. war in Iraq, dissemination of nuclear 
technologies, and terrorism.  Current and future U.S. political administrations may not 
want to antagonize Russia unnecessarily, and Russia’s desired entry into the WTO may 
be one of only places where the United States may be able to exert meaningful leverage.  77
¶22 As a result, Russia’s political importance has allowed it to avoid making the 
necessary changes in its political, judicial, and law enforcement systems to halt piracy.  
Russia has no single agency responsible for IPR enforcement, nor a single policymaker in 
charge of creating or enforcing intellectual property policy.78  Enforcement powers are 
scattered amongst many government agencies, with one entity having authority over plant 
 
(2005). 
70 30 U.S.C. § 202 (2007). See also Mota, supra note 69, at 477. 
71 30 U.S.C. § 202 (2007). See also Mota, supra note 69, at 477. 
72 WTO Request to Join Consultations, U.S. – U.S. Patents Code, WT/DS2124/2 (Feb. 16, 2001), 
available at, http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/224-2.doc. 
73 Terrence M. Brennan, The United States and Brazil Agree to Disagree over Brazil’s Patent Law, 13 
INT. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (2001).  
74 See, e.g., Philip Zelikow, Beyond Boris Yeltsin, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 44 (1994). 
75 Neigel, supra note 28, at 197. 
76 In 2006, combined imports and exports for Brazil, China, and India exceed those of Russia. See 
United States International Trade Commission: U.S. Trade Balance, by Partner Country 2006, at 
http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/cy_m3_run.asp. 
77 See, e.g., Fred Weir, US-Russia Rift Widening, Despite Pact, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., Nov. 21, 2006, 
available at, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1121/p06s02-woeu.html (quoting Viktor Kremeniuk, deputy 
director of the Institute of USA-Canada Studies in Moscow as stating, “The only thing that has prevented a 
full slide into a new cold war was the personal relationship between Bush and Putin. . . . Now, as a result of 
an election that has greatly weakened Bush, he is reaching out to Putin for help on foreign policy issues 
such as Iran, using the only carrot he has: WTO membership.”). 
78 IIPA 2007 Russia, supra note 30, at 132. 
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licensing and another over copyright policy.79  A working government commission to 
address intellectual property problems excludes rights holders from participation.  80
¶23 In a nation where copyright piracy ranks second to none in the world, Russian 
authorities have finally commenced raids against illegal optical disc plants.81  These 
raids, however, are rarely executed by surprise and often undertaken without the 
cooperation of the copyright holders of the pirated materials.82  The result has been that 
almost all of the optical disc plants raided over the last three years remain in operation.83  
Furthermore, Russian authorities are apparently not above outright chicanery to hide the 
extent of piracy.  The IIPA reports that when a U.S. government official met Russian 
government officials in Moscow in late January 2007, all pirated products disappeared 
from the store and market shelves or stores were closed.84  On February 5, after the U.S. 
delegation departed, pirated goods miraculously returned to these establishments.85  The 
Russian government has the resources to suppress piracy, but the lack of strong 
incentives or impending sanctions gives it little reason to do so. 
¶24 India lacks the economic power of China and the political importance of Russia in 
the eyes of the United States.  That does not leave India, however, without an intellectual 
property resistance strategy.  Although India has made significant strides in improving 
intellectual property rights, it has done so only at the slowest possible speed.  Once India 
formally agreed to adopt TRIPS and its associated intellectual property requirements, it 
moved toward compliance at a glacial pace.  Even then, a number of Indian lawmakers 
still resisted implementing TRIPS.86  For example, TRIPS Article 70.8(a) required India 
to establish a patent office for receiving submissions for inventions.87  Yet, a “procedural 
mishandling” enabling legislation caused the Indian Parliament to fail to adopt the 
necessary statutes to establish the patent office within the necessary time.  88
¶25 The United States responded by opening an investigation into India’s failure to 
effectively patent and by filing a formal claim with the WTO.89  The WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body concluded that India failed to comply with TRIPS, and India 
unsuccessfully appealed.90  A March 2, 1998 deadline for India to comply came and 
went.91  After three extensions granted by the United States, India and the U.S. finally 
agreed to a new April, 1999 deadline to implement the necessary legislation.92  By 
March, 1999, India’s legislature finally managed to pass an “emergency measure” 
 
79 Id. at 124. 
80 Id. at 132. 
81 IIPA 2007 Russia, supra note 30, at 122. 
82 Id. at 116. 
83 Id. at 123. 
84 Id. at 126. 
85 Id. 
86 See N. Vasuki Rao, Anti-piracy Conference Turns, Instead, Anti-U.S., J. COMMERCE, Nov. 15, 1996, 
at 5A.   
87 David K. Tomar, Note, A Look Into the WTO Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute between the United 
States and India, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 579, 585 (1999). 
88 Bird, supra note 11, at 345. 
89 Tomar, supra note 87, at 585. 
90 See Report of the Appellate Body, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997). 
91 Tomar, supra note 87, at 589. 
92 Bird, supra note 11, at 346. 
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complying with TRIPS while the backlog of unprocessed patent applications exceeded 
30,000.  93
¶26 Drug firm representatives pressed the USTR again to place India on the Priority 
Foreign Country list in February, 2000.94  Apparently anticipating this pressure, India 
introduced a new patents bill in 1999, but it was eventually shuttled away to a legislative 
committee pending further review.95  Another patent bill emerged again in 2002, but was 
drafted to allow India to grant a compulsory license for patented drugs in a national 
emergency.96  In March 2005, over five years after U.S. applied direct pressure upon 
India to act, India finally enacted a patent law sufficiently protecting software, 
agricultural, and pharmaceutical products.97 
¶27 India’s procedural slowness is not limited to patent infringement.  India has also 
been slow to enact optical disc regulations that would license factories, grant authority to 
conduct surprise inspections, and gather sample discs for forensic testing to prevent 
piracy.98  Legislation implementing these regulations has been under discussion for over 
three years with no immediate sign of passage.99  Amendments necessary to harmonize 
existing copyright law with leading treaties have made no progress, even with many years 
of discussion by a “core group” in the Ministry of Human Resources Development and 
the release of a draft in early 2006 seeking public comment.100  There appears to be little 
sign of Indian procedural efficiency increasing anytime in the future. 
¶28 The Chinese government, while no doubt able to manipulate global public opinion 
like Brazil or drag its legislative heels like India, has been the most direct of all when 
faced with pressure to conform from the United States.  In 1988, the USTR placed China 
on its Priority Watch List and China reacted with improvements to its intellectual 
property laws.101  In 1991, when dissatisfaction from American business generated even 
closer scrutiny of China’s intellectual property practices, the U.S. government threatened 
to impose $1.5 billion in tariffs on a variety of Chinese goods.102  China, by now a 
robustly growing economic power, simply threatened retaliation with its own tariffs on 
American aircraft, chemicals, corn, cotton, and steel.103  After lengthy negotiations, China 
and the United States reached a Memorandum of Understanding in January 1992 (1992 
MOU), narrowly averting a costly trade war.  104
 
93 Id. 
94 Press Release, PhRMA, PhRMA Calls for Vigillance [sic] on Intellectual Property Protection; 
Recommends Argentina, Egypt and India as “Priority Foreign Countries”, 
http://www.pharma.org/mediaroom/press/releases///21.02.2000.20.cfm (Feb. 21, 2000). 
95 Srividhya Ragavan, Can’t we All Get Along? The Case for a Workable Patent Model, 35 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 117, 148 (2003). 
96 Id. at 148 & n.312. 
97 Patents Bill: Govt takes Left on board, BUSINESS STANDARD, Mar. 19, 2005, at 1.(available at 2005 
WLNR 4249411) 
98 International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2007 Special 301 Report (India), at 
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2007/2007SPEC301INDIA.pdf, at 49. [hereinafter IIPA 2007 India] 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Bird, supra note 11, at 340; Yu, supra note 24, at 140-41. 
102 Yu, supra  note 24, at 141-42. 
103 Id. at 142. 
104 Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry’s Influence on Intellectual Property Negotiations and Special 301 
Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87, 112 (1994). 
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¶29 After the 1992 MOU, China significantly improved its intellectual property laws 
and joined the Berne and Geneva Conventions in 1993.105  Yet, in 1994 the United States 
again cited China’s lack of commitment to intellectual property protection and threatened 
to impose tariffs.106  Not surprisingly, China threatened its own tariffs against the United 
States.   Again, a last minute compromise between the nations averted a trade war. 107
¶30 This repeating process of threat, counter-threat, negotiation, and last-minute 
resolution has been rightfully characterized by Peter Yu as a “cycle of futility.”108  The 
cycle continued throughout the 1990s as threatened tariffs by the United States for failure 
to protect intellectual property met with threats of equally damaging Chinese counter-
tariffs against U.S. products.  The cycle halted because of China’s accession to the WTO 
on December 11, 2001.109  China’s membership in the WTO requires the United States to 
resolve any trade disputes with China, as with any WTO member country, through the 
mandatory WTO settlement process.110  This does not mean, however, that American 
businesses will not lobby to use the WTO as a forum to improve intellectual property 
protection.  In 2005, trade groups urged the United States to file a complaint against 
China before the WTO because of inadequate intellectual property protection.111  In 
September, 2007, the WTO opened a formal investigation into U.S. allegations that China 
is insufficiently protecting intellectual property rights.112  Pressure from the United States 
on non-intellectual property trade-related issues continues to result in threatened counter-
sanctions from the Chinese government.  113
II. THE FUTURE OF THE BRICS:  CONVERGENCE AND RESISTANCE 
¶31 As the history described above indicates, the protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights in the BRIC countries has been the product of starts and stops, 
and the journey is clearly far from over.  Much contention likely lies ahead as intellectual 
property continues to increase in economic significance.114  It is tempting to view the 
BRIC’s options for the future from one of two opposing perspectives:  (1) the Western 
property rights view, which argues for strong legal protections and the rejection of free-
riding when a country has the economic strength to participate in global innovation, or 
(2) the Southern open access view, calling for a noble resistance to the coercion of 
 
105 Warren Newberry, Note, Copyright Reform in China: A “TRIPS” Much Shorter and Less Strange 
than Imagined?, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1439 (2003). 
106 Yu, supra note 24, at 144. 
107 Id. 
108 Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO 
China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 904 (2006) (citing Yu, supra note 24, at 140-48). 
109 Id. at 904 n.16. 
110 Id. at 904. 
111 Id.  
112 WTO Inquiry to Examine Counterfeiting in China, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 26, 2007), available at, 
http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB119071094229538578-lMyQjAxMDE3OTIwNTcyMTUwWj.html. 
113 Yu, supra note 108, at 902. 
114 See Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets:  An Economic Analysis, 
22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 735 (2007) (stating that “much of the value of the world's leading companies 
resides in their portfolios of intangible assets” and citing several sources in support).  According to the 
Wall Street Journal, intangible assets, including patents, account for nearly one-third of the value of all U.S. 
stocks, or 45% of GDP.  Nick Timiraos, Businesses Battle Over Patent Laws, WALL ST. J., Jun. 9, 2007, at 
A7. 
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industrialized oppressors intent on maximizing profits without a realistic understanding 
of development needs.   As noted, each variant of the narrative has support.  On one 
hand, the BRICs seem to respond to the economic incentive to limit intellectual property 
enforcement when home industries can effectively copy the creativity and technology of 
industrialized nations.115  Conversely, the property rights push can seem a bit 
disingenuous in view of the fact that many western nations owe aspects of their economic 
development to a lack of intellectual property protection.116  As a result, nations often end 
up talking past each other or resorting to grudging conciliation without truly 
understanding the others’ needs. 
¶32 Perhaps the dichotomous narrative is simply wrong on both counts.   One can argue 
that it misses a middle ground that may better characterize the optimal future relationship 
of the BRICs with developed countries, as well as the larger developing world.  It is 
possible that a hybrid model of intellectual property protection and occasional 
exception—a process of convergence and resistance—will provide the mix necessary for 
developing countries to gain an economic foothold, protect the health and safety of their 
citizens, and play a responsible and vital role in the world economy.  This model may not 
mimic the regimes of industrialized nations now, or event in the distant future.  But it 
may provide a predictable projection the value of investment incentives in these growing 
global markets. 
¶33 In assessing the future of BRIC intellectual property regimes, most commentators 
choose to focus on copyright and trademark piracy.  Indeed, as described above, it is the 
area that is subject to most scrutiny and is easily followed as a measure of progress.  
However, other areas of intellectual property protection have broader significance to most 
industries and may provide a more significant economic yardstick.   In particular, patents 
are the cornerstone of industrial innovation investment,117 and a country’s willingness to 
provide substantial protection can provide a reasonable basis for assessing its 
commitment to property rights and other investment incentives. For that reason, these 
 
115 For example, India’s strength in generic pharmaceutical manufacturing has arguably pushed it 
toward more relaxed intellectual property protection over the pharmaceutical innovations of foreign 
companies.  See Rishi Gupta, TRIPS Compliance: Dealing with the Consequences of Drug Patents in India, 
26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 599, 602–03 (2003).  Conversely, this ability to copy the inventions of foreign 
companies is one of the classical rationales for intellectual property protection.  See Peter K. Yu, 
Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, Res. Paper No. 04-23, at pp. 4-5 
(2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=978301.  
116 See FATUMTA JAWARA & AILEEN KWA, BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE WTO: THE REAL WORLD OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 36 (2004) (“The USA, Germany, Japan and Korea, for example, all 
industrialized largely by copying existing product and/or process technologies . . ..”). 
117 SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 11-14 (2004) (describing the central role of 
patents in the great innovations of the late 19th and 20th centuries)..  This is particular true in industries like 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.  Stephen G. Kunin et al., Reach-Through Claims in the Age of 
Biotechnology, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 609, 615 (2002).  One would be remiss in overlooking the important 
contribution of trade secret protection as an important investment mechanism as well.  Trade secrets are the 
flip side of patents, providing protection when the costs of public disclosure exceed the gains of monopoly.  
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 326–29 (2003) (describing three economic justifications for the patent system based on inventor 
incentives and alternate behavior if only trade secret protections existed); Vincenzo Denicolò & Luigi 
Alberto Franzoni, The Contract Theory of Patents, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 365 (2004) (analyzing patent 
economics by considering trade secrets as the alternative).  However, such protections are by definition, 
less transparent than patents, and therefore less useful as a means of assessment. 
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“hard” IP assets merit substantive investigation in any discussion of BRIC intellectual 
property regimes.    118
A. Pharmaceutical Patents as an IP Bellwether  
¶34 Pharmaceuticals are the basis of treatment for a wide variety of public health 
problems from recent global pandemics like AIDS,119 to diseases like malaria that have 
dogged mankind for millennia.120 A great deal of investment is required to bring a 
pharmaceutical to market,121 much of it tied up in research endeavors that never come to 
fruition for a variety of reasons.122  The most common drugs today are known as “small 
molecule” compounds, meaning that they have a relatively simple structure that can be 
easily understood by a skilled chemist.123  In contrast, in the emerging science of 
biotechnology, the structure of treatment compounds is often so complex that it eludes 
easy characterization.124  The current dependence on small-molecule pharmaceuticals is 
significant because, without strong protection, they are relatively easy to copy by third 
parties, even without the use of a company’s inside know-how.125  This means that, 
without a powerful legal mechanism to protect the investment from competition, it is 
likely to be erased by free riders.  126
¶35 Patent rights—which are a form of property protection127—provide the primary 
exclusion mechanism for pharmaceuticals.  They can cover several aspects of a drug, 
including the actual compound,  the method of treatment, the method of manufacture,    the 
formulation, or any combination.   It has been demonstrated that the pharmaceutical 128
 
118 Intellectual property attorneys often refer to patents as “hard IP,” and trade secrets, copyrights and 
trademarks as “soft IP.”  See Marc E. Hankin, Comment, Now that we Know “the Way Forward,” Let us 
Stay the Course, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1299 (2002). 
119 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (“UNDP”), HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, at 
3 (2005), available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/HDR05_HDI.pdf (“the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic has inflicted the single greatest reversal in human development.”). 
120 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH: INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 2-3 (2006). 
121 See Joseph DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 151, 166–68, 180 (2003). 
122 Henry Grabowski, Politics, Policy and Availability: Patent and New Product Development in the 
Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industry, 8 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 7, 9 (2003) (“most new drug 
candidates fail to reach the market.”). 
123 Gregory N. Mandel, The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry’s Unintended Admission the Biotech 
Patents Fail Enablement, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 60 (2006) (“Small molecule drugs are relatively easy to 
copy and test for equivalence.”).
124 Id. at 61. 
125 Patricia M. Festin, The Regulatory, Economic, and Privacy Implications of Pharmacogenomics, 10 
VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 12 (2005). 
126 Id. 
127 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (patents have the attributes of personal property under U.S. law); General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Preamble, 
Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81, 84 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] (“[r]ecognizing that intellectual property rights 
are private rights”).  The essential element of a patent right is that it confers upon its owner the right to 
exclude others from practicing the invention. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND 
WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 70 (1969) (patents create incentives 
by conferring monopoly power for a limited period of time).  The patent right can also be sold or licensed 
like a tangible property right.    
128 Stephanie Greene, A Prescription for Change:  How the Medicare Act Revises Hatch-Waxman to 
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industry responds positively to patent protection, much more so than do other 
industries.129  Investment in research and development really does appear to track 
substantive protection for pharmaceutical patents. 
¶36 On the other hand, the information embodied in valuable medicines presents a 
tempting target for acquisition.  From a social perspective, the desire to increase access to 
all those in need may conflict with the pricing or distribution plans of the property 
owner.130  From an economic perspective, the ability to reap local profits from high-cost 
innovation produced in other nations may lead to an equally strong desire to limit 
property protection.131  In both cases, the countervailing forces to intellectual property 
incentives present a classic test of commitment to industrialized nation ideals for the 
BRICs.  They provide a useful lens for predicting the high technology future of these 
nations. 
B. Recent Progress Toward Basic Protection 
¶37 It may not come as a complete surprise that the BRICs as a group have only 
recently included substantive patent protection for pharmaceutical compounds.  But this 
fact glosses over the historical complexity of patent rights in this area and suggests the 
existence of opportunism on the part of the BRICs that is inaccurate.  In the first place, 
the fact that a nation should confer patent protection to a pharmaceutical was not a 
foregone conclusion before the TRIPS agreement.  In fact, at the time the language was 
settled, over 50 countries (including many industrialized nations) did not provide patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals.132  The reasons were varied, including narrow subject 
matter provisions as well as public health policy.   Secondly, it is undeniable that the 
BRICs have made significant efforts to adopt TRIPS compliant–some would say, 
Western–patent rights for pharmaceuticals; the playing field is much more level today 
than it was only 15 years ago. 
¶38 India provides perhaps the most interesting case of transitioning patent protection.  
Its lack of pharmaceutical patent protection leading up to TRIPS was actually the result 
 
Speed Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 30 J. CORP. L. 309, 316 n.30 (2005) 
129 See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 174–
75 (1986).  See also FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 4–14 (2003) (“Representatives from the pharmaceutical 
industry stated that patent protection is indispensable in promoting pharmaceutical innovation for drug 
products containing new chemical entities.”). 
130 Multinational companies often engage in open price discrimination, wherein goods are sold at 
different prices in across the globe, based not on differences in production or distribution costs, but on the 
maximum price that can be obtained in different markets. Patricia Danzon & Adrian Towse, Differential 
Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: Reconciling Access, R&D and Patents, 3 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 
183, 201–02 (2003). 
131 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
132 Kelley A. Friedgen, Rethinking the Struggle Between Health & Intellectual Property:  A Proposed 
Framework for Dynamic, Rather that Absolute, Patent Protection of Essential Medicines, 16 EMORY INT'L 
L. REV. 689 696-97 (2002).  A very interesting discussion by Julio Nogués notes how recent 
pharmaceutical patent protection is many of the world’s most economically powerful countries.  Julio 
Nogués, Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs, World Bank Working Paper PS 502, at pp. 3-4 (1990), 
available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1990/09/01/000009265_3960929170142/Render
ed/PDF/multi0page.pdf (stating that pharmaceutical patents have only been available in Germany since 
1968, Italy since 1978, Japan since 1976, Sweden since 1978 and Switzerland since 1977).   
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of a change in the law in the 1970s.  Prior to that time, owing to its colonial lineage to 
Britain, India did provide patent protection to both pharmaceutical compounds and 
methods for manufacture.133  However, the 1970 revisions to the Indian Patent Act 
removed protection for compounds.134  The rationale was entirely practical—India 
determined that foreign investment in its domestic pharmaceutical industry was lacking, 
and local drug development was unlikely to occur in the near future.135  The country 
could do far better by fostering the growth of a local generic industry founded on the 
production of drugs created in Western nations.  This move was extremely successful 
from the standpoint of industrial development.  India’s generic drug industry is now one 
of the most robust in the world.  The fact that this growth was underpinned on the un-
recouped investment of developed nations did not escape the TRIPS negotiators, and 
countries like India were expected to include compound protection as a consequence of 
membership.136  A transition period was instituted that allowed developing countries time 
to create such protection.137  That period ended for India in 2005, when it formally 
introduced patent rights for pharmaceutical compounds.  138
¶39 As described above, Brazil’s pattern of pharmaceutical protection is similar to 
India’s but without the early post-colonial period of patent protection.  Brazil added 
pharmaceutical compound protection in 1997.139  The revised law now complies with 
TRIPS, at least in regard to subject-matter protection.  Very soon after, in 1999, Brazil 
instituted a formal system for the approval of generic pharmaceuticals.140  These 
provisions have ensured that Brazil has a strong domestic manufacturing industry, though 
it has been suggested it would be stronger if the government’s public stance on IP were 
more favorable to innovation.  141
¶40 On the other hand, as a communist nation, China did not provide private ownership 
of patents on pharmaceuticals.   The first break in the barrier to invention rights came in 142
 
133 Samira Guennif & Julien Chaisse, Present Stakes Around Patent Political Economy:  Legal and 
Economic Lessons from the Pharmaceutical Patent Rights in India, 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 65, 69 (2007). 
134 Id. at 69-70. 
135 Id.  
136 See TRIPS, supra note 127, at art. 27 (requiring that patents be available in all areas of technology, 
with a few specific exceptions such as multicelled plants and animals and medical methods for the 
treatment of humans or animals).   
137 Id. at arts. 65 & 70.8; Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 863 
(2007). 
138 The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, available at 
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.PDF.  The transition was not entirely smooth.  In 1996, 
the United States filed a dispute against India in the WTO, alleging that India failed to provide the 
necessary interim protection for existing pharmaceutical compounds.  Panel Report, India-Patent Protection 
for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997).
139 Lei No. 9.279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, D.O., 15/05/1996 (93, 1): 8353, 15.05.1996, translation 
available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/brazil1.html,; Marques, supra note 53, at 473.
140 Lei No. 9.787, de 10 de fevereiro de 1999. See Vera Valente, Generics in Latin America: An 
Analysis of the Brazilian Experience, 4 J. GENERIC MEDS. 30, 31 (2006). 
141 See, e.g., Lawrence A .Kogan, Brazil’s IP Opportunism Threatens U.S. Private Property Rights, 38 
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (2006) (suggesting that, due to the Brazilian government’s anti-IP 
policies, European investment in research and development is shifting to the United States).
142 Averie K. Hason & Jean E. Shimotake, Recent Development in Patent Rights for Pharmaceuticals in 
China and India, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 303, 305 (2006) (noting that China had a form of patent protection 
dating from the 1950s, but ownership resided in the state); Jeffrey A. Andrews, Pfizer’s Viagra Patent and 
the Promise of Patent Protection in China, 28 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 6 n.20 (2006) 
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1984, when China agreed to establish a basic patent system.143  However, like India a 
decade and a half before, rights were extended only to processes, not compounds.144  It 
wasn’t until the 1992 MOU that China agreed to extend protection to pharmaceutical 
compounds.145  Interestingly, a regulatory procedure existed under China’s Drug 
Administration Law, which protected any pharmaceutical product that had not been 
previously manufactured in China as a new drug.146  Because foreign sales were not 
included under the original provision, local manufacturers could copy foreign drugs and 
sell them with exclusivity, even as against the company that originally developed the 
drug.  147
¶41 Owing to its communist past, Russia, like China, also did not have a system for 
protecting intellectual property rights. 148  However, patent rights were protected prior to 
the communist revolution.149  Whether this has smoothed the way toward a modern 
intellectual property system is open to question.  At any rate, since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, Russia has instituted modern patent property rights with individual ownership.150  
As part of this system, Russia currently protects pharmaceutical patents, though it offers 
an interesting enforcement exception to pharmacies in making prescriptive 
preparations.  151
¶42 Thus, despite divergent pasts, the BRICs are generally on the same page today 
when it comes to the protections afforded pharmaceuticals.  Of course, granting the rights 
on paper is only the first step.  All of the BRICs have faced difficulties in convincing 
developed countries that their respective pharmaceutical granting and enforcement 
regime are reasonably rigorous and unbiased.  This has led to accusations that the rights 
are but a first step, contingent on a serious follow-through yet to be seen.   Incidents 152
 
143 Hason & Shimotake, supra note 142, at 305 (citing Patent Law of the People's Republic of China 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Sixth Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 
1984) (P.R.C.)); Andrews, supra note 142, at 6.
144 Id. (stating that “pharmaceutical products and substances obtained by means of a chemical process” 
was one of the areas excepted from patentability). 
145 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the People's Republic of 
China (1992), TIAS No 12,036; Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor is Far Away: China’s Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights Protection, 1986-2006, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 231, 235 (2006).
146 Eliza Yibing Zhou, Chinese Biogenerics and Protection of IP, GENETIC ENG’G & BIOTECHNOLOGY 
NEWS, Sep. 1, 2006, at 58, available at http://www.genengnews.com/articles/chitem.aspx?aid=1875. 
147 Id. 
148 Sergey Budylin & Yulia Osipova, Total Upgrade: Intellectual Property Reform in Russia, 1 COLUM. 
J. E. EUR. L. 1, 4 (2007); Mariyetta Meyers, Russia and the Internet: Russia’s Need to Confront and 
Conquer Trademark Infringement in Domain Names and Elsewhere on the Web, 9 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 200, 
204 (2006). 
149 Meyers, supra note 144, at 204 n.10; Julian Zegelman, Features — Researching Intellectual 
Property Law in the Russian Federation (Aug. 19, 2005), http://www.llrx.com/features/russiaiplaw.htm. 
150 Marina Portnova, Ownership and Enforcement of Patent Rights in Russia:  Protecting an Invention 
in the Existing Environment, 8 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 505, 511-12 (1998).  Russia also grants patents 
as a member of the Eurasian Patent Organization, along with many of the formal Soviet republics.  
SeeHugh Brett, Origins and Activities of the Eurasian Patent Organization (May 2004), 
http://scientific.thomson.com/free/ipmatters/patof/8224240/.  
151 Patentnyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Patent Law of the Russian Federation] No. 3517-1, Sept. 23, 
1992, 42 VSND i VS RF No. 42, item 2139 (1992), amended by Federal Law No. 22-FZ, Feb. 7, 2003, at 
art. 11, translation available at http://www.fips.ru/ruptoen2/law/patent_law.htm (Russia) (Acts not 
recognized as infringements on the Exclusive Right of the Patent Owner). 
152 See, e.g., Asia Market Survey: IP Issues for Rights Owners, ASIALAW, Apr. 1, 2007, at 1 (“Despite 
considerable improvements to the legislative environment in several key jurisdictions in Asia, particularly 
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have included somewhat expected variants on pharmaceutical counterfeiting in China,153 
Russia,  and Brazil.154 155  However, the most prominent disputes that epitomize the 
complexity of the issues come from India and China. 
¶43 With the introduction of its pharmaceutical product patent regime in 2005, India 
sought to delineate between groundbreaking invention and obvious extension of known 
compounds.156  At first glance, this seems like the typical standard that patentable 
inventions be nonobvious  (or have sufficient inventive step157 158).  However, it has been 
argued that India’s system seeks to go further by excluding so-called “me too” drugs or 
“evergreening” – extending the basic pharmaceutical protection with less innovative 
modifications that keep the drug under proprietary control for a longer period of time.159  
To the extent that this precludes protection for legitimate inventions, branded drug 
companies are concerned. 
¶44 A recent dispute that elucidates this point concerned the anti-cancer drug Gleevec, 
produced by Novartis.160  In 2005, India’s patent office denied a patent on the 
pharmaceutical compound, stating that it was not sufficiently inventive over previous 
iterations of the chemical, and Novartis appealed.161  Novartis argued that the exception 
to patent protection in the new Indian statute is a blatant attempt to deny protection to a 
very common class of drugs—those that make viable treatments by improving on less 
useful compounds—in favor of permitting early generic competition.162  According to 
Novartis, this violated TRIPS guarantees.163  In August, 2007, this contentious battle 
concluded with the somewhat uneventful decision that the Indian courts had no 
 
China and India, intellectual property rights advocates remain concerned about haphazard enforcement.”). 
153 See, e.g.,Walt Bogdanich & Jake Hooker, From China to Panama, a Trail of Poisoned Medicine, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2007, at 1.1; Geoff Dyer, Chinese Students ‘Copied Tamiflu’, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 31, 
2007, at 2. 
154 See, e.g., Andrew E. Kramer, Drug Piracy: A Wave of Counterfeit Medicines Washes Over Russia, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 5, 2006, at C.1. 
155 See, e.g., Laurie Goering, Contraceptive Pill Scam Shakes Brazil, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jul. 19, 1998, at 
A.27. 
156 Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India), section 3(d) (prohibiting 
a new form of a known substance from being patented unless this new form has considerably better 
accuracy). 
157 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). 
158 The phrase “inventive step” as used in Europe and Japan is equivalent to the U.S. “obviousness” 
requirement.  See Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 56, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 254, 
273, at art. 56.  (“An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the 
state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.”); David J. Abraham, Shinpo-Sei: Japanese 
Inventive Step Meets U.S. Non-Obviousness, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 528, 529–30 (1995) 
159 Tatum Andersen, Rejected Novartis Cases Leave India’s TRIPS Compliance Unchallenged, INTELL. 
PROP. WATCH, Aug. 7, 2007, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=712&res=1024_( “[Section 
3(d) was drafted with the prevention of a particular practice in mind: evergreening, where pharmaceutical 
companies patent frivolous changes to their drugs in order to extend patent protection, thereby preventing 
generic companies from manufacturing cheaper drugs the poor can better afford.”). 
160 Id.  
161 Affidavit filed on Behalf of Petitioner, Novartis AG v. Union of India, W.P.No.24759 (Madras H.C. 
May 17, 2006) [hereinafter Novartis Affidavit], available at 
http://www.lawyerscollective.org/%5Eamtc/%5EPatent_Oppositions/W.P.NO.24759.doc. 
162 Id. at 17-20; Novartis Press Release, Improving Indian Patent Law Benefits Patients and Societies 
(created Jun. 12, 2007), available at http://www.novartis.com/downloads/about-novartis/Novartis_position-
Glivec_Gleevec_patent_case_india.pdf 
163 Novartis Affidavit, supra note 161, at 17-19.  
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jurisdiction to assess what is essentially an international trade dispute.164  Given the Swiss 
government’s reluctance to take the dispute to the WTO on behalf of Novartis,165 it is 
likely that India will remain to have a diminished forum for pharmaceutical patents for 
quite some time.  166
¶45 In contrast is the Chinese patent office’s decision in 2004 to deny protection on the 
core compounds for Pfizer’s blockbuster drug, Viagra.167  Given the success in 
convincing various patent offices across the world of Viagra’s patentability, Pfizer 
publicly accused the Chinese government of reneging on its promise to provide 
substantial protection to pharmaceuticals (particularly those owned by foreign firms) in 
compliance with TRIPS.168  Many viewed the dispute as a test of China’s dedication to 
intellectual property compliance.169  In the end, a Chinese appellate court reversed the 
decision of the patent office in 2006 and granted the protection Pfizer sought.  170
C. Exceptions and Negotiation advantages 
¶46 The intellectual property future of the BRICs is certainly told in the first chapter by 
the rights accorded and the enforcement thereof.  This is indeed important and has rightly 
received the most attention as a critical first step.  However, there is a second chapter that 
may be more meaningful for qualifying the conditions of the future BRIC relationship 
with developed countries.  This is a chapter that concerns official TRIPS-sanctioned 
exemptions permitted to rights enforcement—instances in which patent rights may 
legitimately be ignored or relaxed—creating an impact that is both political and 
economic.  It may be possible for the BRIC nations to adopt an approach to these 
flexibilities that is predictable, yet different than developed countries, providing the 
optimal benefit to the citizens of these respective nations.  The context of 
pharmaceuticals provides an early highlight of the power and effect of such an approach 
that should translate into other fields. 
¶47 While there are a variety of possible enforcement nuances created by legislatures 
(as well as courts in the case of common law countries like India171), the most important 
limitation on private rights is the ability of the government to appropriate for public use.  
 
164 Novartis AG v. Union of India, W.P. Nos. 24759 and 24760 (Madras H.C. Aug. 6, 2007), available 
at http://www.lawyerscollective.org/%5Eamtc/current_issues/Judgement.pdf. 
165 See Andersen, supra note 159 (noting that the Swiss government signed an intellectual property 
“memorandum of understanding” with the Indian government on August 7, suggesting alternate means of 
resolving TRIPS-oriented disputes).  
166 It is possible that India’s local pharmaceutical companies my challenge the provision at some point 
in the future, as they have become prominent innovators in the pharmaceutical arts.  See Financial Insight: 
Subtle Win in Patent Loss, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2007, at C.14. 
167 Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Reports China has Lifted its Viagra Patent, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2004, at C.1. 
168 Andrews, supra note 142, at 1-2; Yu, supra note 108, at 988-89. 
169 See, e.g., James Kynge, China Overturns Viagra Patent, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2004, at 27; Ken 
Howard, Patent Fights Rumble in China, 3 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 988, 988 (2004). According 
to one report, after six month on the market, 90% of the Viagra sold in Shanghi was fake.  Pfizer Wins 
Chinese Viagra Ruling, BBC NEWS, Jun. 5, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5047640.stm 
170 Nicholas Zamiska, Bejing Court Backs Patent Protection for Viagra, WALL ST. J., Jun. 3, 2006 at 
A.3. 
171 India might be more accurately described as “mixed common law,” because it incorporates other 
legal traditions.  See Wayne R. Barnes, Contemplating a Civil Law Paradigm for a Future International 
Commercial Code, 65 LA. L. REV. 677, 684 (2005).  But it is clearly not a civil law country. 
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Such appropriations are usually referred to as compulsory licenses because monetary 
compensation in exchange for the use is proffered.172  The TRIPS agreement actually 
requires “adequate remuneration,”  though this term is ambiguous to say the least.173 174  
This compulsory license appropriation theoretically could take the form of an ex ante 
exception that permits a government the right to automatically use a right, but this 
appears to be prohibited in the patent context175 by the TRIPS requirement that 
“authorization . . . be considered on the individual merits.”176  More relevant is the ex 
post compulsory license, a post-invention determination to relax property rights for some 
overarching purpose.  Historic examples have included licenses for military use,  public 
works,  the development of local industry,  and public health.  177
¶48 All the BRIC countries have compulsory license statutes.  Moreover, despite the 
difference in historical development of intellectual property rights, the BRICs have 
surprisingly similar exemptions.  This likely stems from the fact that such rights have 
been retained by most industrialized nations for over 100 years178—not to mention 
enshrined in the historic 1898 Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property179—and the BRIC statutes and policies are simply derivative of what other 
nations have generally agreed upon.  More broadly, compulsory license rights can be 
viewed as one aspect of a government’s sovereign power over property rights within its 
domain,180 making the existence of such powers in the BRICs as well as most other 
nations unsurprising. 
 
172 Daniel R. Cahoy, Confronting Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha, 42 GA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=989817, at p. 10. 
173 TRIPS, supra note 127, at art. 31(h) 
174 See generally Cahoy, supra note 172. 
175 Interestingly, ex ante compulsory licenses do exist prominently in other contexts.  For example, in 
United States copyright law, there is an automatic compulsory license for making and distributing 
phonorecords.  See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000). 
176 TRIPS, supra note 127, at art. 31(a). 
177 Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary Liceinsing of Patented Inventions, 
UNCTAD-ICTSD Issue Paper No. 5 (2004), available at 
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/iprs/CS_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf. 
For a consideration of examples in the United States, see Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side 
Effects of Cipro®:  A Reevaluation of Compensation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 40 
AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 135-36 (2002). 
178 Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for 
Developing Countries, South Centre, at Part II (1999), 
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/complicence/toc.htm (stating that compulsory licensing exist in 
various forms in the patent laws of approximately one hundred countries and dates back to the English 
Statue of Monopolies in 1623). 
179 July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6295, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention], 
at art. 5(a). 
180 This could be analogous to eminent domain power in the United States, which is generally 
understood to underlie the statutory compensation mechanism. See Cahoy, supra note 177, at 142-151 
(describing the ambiguity in treating 28 U.S.C. § 1498 as an eminent domain jurisdictional statute – the 
“eminent domain theory” – versus an exception to the patent grant – the “established statutory theory.”). 
However, the recent Federal Circuit case of Zoltek Corp. v. U.S., 442 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(citing Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894), casts some doubt on this notion, ruling tha § 1498 
was not based on eminent domain because the Supreme Court had previously ruled that government 
infringement and eminent domain are different acts..  Many countries appear to treat compulsory license 
compensation as something less than the full taking of a tangible property right.  See Cahoy, supra note 
172, at p. 35-36.  At least one author has argued that this view may be inconsistent with the obligations 
attendant to bilateral investment treaties. Carlos M. Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free 
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¶49 The component available in all the BRIC compulsory licensing statutes is the 
provision for government use in times of national emergency.181  This would certainly 
include health care crises, but it could also encompass other subjects of national 
importance such as anti-terrorism initiatives.  Additionally, India, Brazil and Russia have 
what might be termed “local working” provisions, meaning that failure to manufacture a 
patented article locally may lead to the imposition of a license.182 Similarly, India, China 
and Russia permit private parties to request a license to exploit the patent right following 
the failure of negotiation with the patent owner, regardless of evidence of local 
working.  183














31bis on other 
Exports Patents 
Brazil X X  X  X 
184Russia X    X X   X 
India X X X X X X 
China X  X  X X 
 
¶50 Perhaps the most significant compulsory license use by BRIC countries will come 
not from supplying the home market, but rather from exporting pharmaceuticals to 
developing or least-developed countries that have taken out licenses.  As noted above, 
India, China and Brazil each have significant pharmaceutical manufacturing sectors and 
 
Trade Agreements: Implications for the Granting of Compulsory Licenses, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 331, 348-
51 (2004).   
181 Lei No. 9.279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, D.O., 15/05/1996 (93, 1): 8353, 15.05.1996 (Brazil), 
translation available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/brazil1.html, at art. 71; Patent Law (adopted at 
the 4th Meeting of the Standing Comm. Nat’l Pepole’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Sept. 4, 1992, 
amended again Aug. 25, 2000 (P.R.C.), translation available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/lawsregulations/200203/t20020327_33872.htm, at art. 49; 
Patentnyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Patent Law of the Russian Federation] No. 3517-1, Sept. 23, 1992, 
42 VSND i VS RF No. 42, item 2139 (1992), amended by Federal Law No. 22-FZ, Feb. 7, 2003 (Russia), 
translation available at http://www.fips.ru/ruptoen2/law/patent_law.htm, at art. 11; Patents (Amendment) 
Act, 2002, No. 38, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India), at sect. 92. 
182 Lei No. 9.279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, D.O., 15/05/1996 (93, 1): 8353, 15.05.1996 (Brazil), 
translation available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/brazil1.html, at art. 68; Patentnyi Zakon 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Patent Law of the Russian Federation] No. 3517-1, Sept. 23, 1992, 42 VSND i VS 
RF No. 42, item 2139 (1992), amended by Federal Law No. 22-FZ, Feb. 7, 2003(Russia), translation 
available at http://www.fips.ru/ruptoen2/law/patent_law.htm, at art. 10; Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, 
No. 38, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India), at sect. 92. 
183 Patent Law (adopted at the 4th Meeting of the Standing Comm. Nat’l Pepole’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, 
amended Sept. 4, 1992, amended again Aug. 25, 2000 (P.R.C.), translation available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/lawsregulations/200203/t20020327_33872.htm, at art. 48; 
Patentnyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Patent Law of the Russian Federation] No. 3517-1, Sept. 23, 1992, 
42 VSND i VS RF No. 42, item 2139 (1992), amended by Federal Law No. 22-FZ, Feb. 7, 2003, (Russia), 
translation available at http://www.fips.ru/ruptoen2/law/patent_law.htm, at art. 10; Patents (Amendment) 
Act, 2002, No. 38, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India), at sect. 91. 
184 The Russian license to enable local working can be first imposed four years after the patent grant. 
Patentnyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Patent Law of the Russian Federation] No. 3517-1, Sept. 23, 1992, 
42 VSND i VS RF No. 42, item 2139 (1992), amended by Federal Law No. 22-FZ, Feb. 7, 2003, (Russia), 
translation available at http://www.fips.ru/ruptoen2/law/patent_law.htm, at art. 11.
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are accomplished at producing generic medications.  It is entirely reasonable that if the 
rarely-used TRIPS article 31bis becomes more widely applied,185 these BRIC members 
have a good opportunity to become significant players.  Notably, nothing in article 31bis 
suggests that companies located in exporting members should not have the ability to 
make a profit.  As long as the final price of the generic pharmaceutical is sufficiently 
advantageous in view of additional costs and royalties to patent owners, a significant 
profit margin may be possible.  186
¶51 Despite the similarities in compulsory licensing provisions, there is a significant 
divergence in how those flexibilities have been historically utilized in the BRICs.  The 
differences serve as an outline of relative intellectual property development, and may 
provide a metric for future evaluation.  More importantly, it is possible that one path will 
provide the paradigm for the other BRICs seeking a balance between rights and access. 
¶52 By far the most extreme use of compulsory licenses has come from Brazil.  In 
recent years, Brazil has threatened to impose compulsory licenses for AIDS medicines, 
only to pull back at the last minute after achieving negotiation victory.187  However, in 
May of 2007, Brazil finally issued a patent compulsory license after failing to achieve the 
desired price on the drug, Efavirenz.188  It is likely that the move was at least partially 
sparked by the desire to obtain the same price Thailand secured following its successful 
issuance of several compulsory licenses for AIDS and heart drugs.189  As noted above, 
Brazil clearly intends to aggressively push the envelope on property rights flexibilities.190  
However, that posture has generated a lot of controversy.191  As a result, it is possible that 
Brazil may lose some foreign direct investment opportunities and face other multinational 
“sanctions” for its behavior.192  While the costs may currently be outweighed by the 
benefits of access to IP, it is possible that companies’ desire to punish Brazil will become 
a more important obstacle in the future. 
 
185 See Cahoy, supra note 172, at 17-21 (noting that recent international agreements have paved the way 
to increased compulsory licensing). 
186 Id. at 15-17. 
187 Yu, supra note 137, at 846-47. 
188 Concede licenciamento compulsório, por interesse público, de patentes referentes ao Efavirenz para 
fins de uso público nãocomercial. Decreto No. 6.108, de 4 de Maio de 2007, D.O.U. de 07.04.2007 (Brazil) 
189 See Andrew Jack & Richard Lapper, Brazil Spurns Patent on HIV Drug, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 2007, at 
9 (“Talks broke down earlier in the week between the authorities and Merck, which resisted Brazil's calls to 
reduce its price from Dollars 1.57 a patient a day to the 65 cents at which it is sold to Thailand.”). 
190 See supra notes 52-73, and accompanying text. 
191 Not surprisingly, the outcry against Brazil’s license has come from the pharmaceutical industry and 
property rights advocates.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, AIDS Drugs: Are Property Rights and Human 
Rights in Conflict, FT.COM, May 7, 2007 at 1 (“[D]ecisions like those in Brazil and Thailand cripple 
incentives to invest in new drugs, particularly for AIDS, for which sick people worldwide will pay the price 
tomorrow.”).  In favor of Brazil’s actions have been several NGOs that promote access to medicines in 
developing countries.  See, e.g., Essential Action, Brazil Decides to be Held Hostage No More (May 4, 
2007), available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2007-May/011110.html (“Brazil's initiative 
is a crucial step to help the country maintain its effective program to treat people with HIV/AIDS, the 
viability of which is threatened by high brand-name prices for second-generation drugs.”). 
192 See, e.g., Merck & Co., Press Release, Statement on Brazilian Government’s Decision to Issue 
Compulsory License for Stocrin (May 4, 2007), available at 
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/press_releases/corporate/2007_0504.html (“This decision by the GOB 
will have a negative impact on Brazil's reputation as an industrialized country seeking to attract inward 
investment, and thus its ability to build world-class research and development.”). 
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¶53 Although India has not had a history of compulsory licensing in goods covered by 
patent rights, it has prominently set out to act as the low-cost drugstore to the developing 
world.  The most significant move in this regard is India’s enactment of a provision to 
permit pharmaceutical exports to countries that have enacted article 31bis compulsory 
licenses.193  Moreover, when issues have arisen about the global availability of generic 
versions of essential medicines, Indian companies have publicly stood out as primary 
providers.  194
¶54 On the other end of the spectrum is Russia.  It has been largely absent in the 
compulsory licensing game to date and pharmaceutical patent rights are not a prominent 
topic of discussion.  There are no reports of such licenses in any field, and Russia has not 
set itself up as an exporter of licensed, patented goods.195  One reason for the lack of 
compulsory license activity may be the relative weakness of intellectual property rules in 
Russia coupled with the fact that the WTO does not act as a strengthening force (because 
Russia is not yet a member).196  It appears that Russia’s position may be due to the 
extreme ground it must cover in developing rights, but one would expect it will face the 
same issues as the other BRIC countries very soon. 
¶55 And then there is China.  The country has also made very public gestures to 
establish itself as an intellectual property proponent rather than a free rider.197  It has 
never granted a compulsory license.198  On the other hand, it clearly intends to be a player 
in the generic medicines trade.  Most prominently, China publicly agreed to refrain from 
using the provisions of TRIPS article 31bis to import pharmaceuticals, the only BRIC to 
do so.199  The country appears to be working toward a quiet balance of investment 
incentives and flexibilities.  Because China retains options but no longer openly 
provokes, it may attract foreign investment while serving its particular interests as a 
developing nation.  This model of intellectual property balance may present the best 
articulation for the future of the BRICs. 
 
193 Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India), at sect. 92A. 
194 See Andrew Jack & Khozem Merchant, Indian Drugs Groups in Talks to Provide Generic Copies of 
Tamifllu, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2005, at 3 (describing the quick response of Indian drug companies to the 
possible need for generic copies of Tamiflu in the wake of a bird flu epidemic); David W. Opderbeck, 
Patents, Essential Medicines, and the Innovation Game, 58 VAND. L. REV. 501, 522-25 (2005) 
195 Knowledge Ecology International (“KEI”) keeps a fairly accurate list of countries that have enacted 
legislation to enable article 31bis compulsory licenses.  See KEI, Legislation to Allow for the Export of 
Pharmaceuticals Produced Under Compulsory License, http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cl-export-
legislation.html (last visited Sep. 21, 2007). 
196 WTO, Accessions: Russian Federation, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm 
(last visited Sep. 21, 2007) (describing negotiations on the Russian Federation’s accession to the WTO).  
But see Frances Williams, Ukraine Ahead of Russia in WTO Entry Bid, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 27, 2007, at 2 
(noting that Russia has a chance of joining the WTO by the end of 2007). 
197 Massey, supra note 145, at 236 (“[C]entral government leaders and their policies no longer ignore or 
promote the infringement of intellectual property.”); Yu, supra note 108, at 906-922 (detailing the dramatic 
changes China has made in its intellectual property laws since accession into the WTO). 
198 Eu Jin Chua, The Laws of the People’s Republic of China: An Introduction for International 
Investors, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 133, 152 (2006). 
199 WTO, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS (Sep. 2006), available at 
http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/TRIPS_e/public_health_faq_e.htm. 
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D. Toward a BRIC Model of IP Protection for Developing Countries 
¶56 In view of the economic power of the BRICs, the need to develop innovative 
industries, and the serious health issues faced by the population of each, it seems fairly 
obvious that neither extreme of the existing intellectual property rights model fits 
perfectly.  The BRICs have good reason for agreeing to strengthen rights to a degree, but 
also have a great need to limit the intellectual property power envisioned by the Western 
paradigm.  And they pack the power to resist capitulation that is not in their interest.  The 
relative similarities of these key aspects of BRIC industrial development suggest that a 
hybrid model of intellectual property protection may serve them best. 
¶57 What are the key aspects of the BRIC hybrid intellectual property model?  In 
essence, it must include provisions and negotiation tactics that demonstrate an overall 
respect for intellectual property, while maintaining the ability to act in the social interest 
of their respective populations.  It should generally eschew blatant free riding or 
protectionism, while publicly declaring the right to subrogate rights in times of crisis. It 
may end up being closely aligned to China’s current strategy.  In any case, the essential 
points can be articulated rather simply: (1) respect for rights and the development of 
dependable institutions; (2) exploitation of TRIPS flexibilities when public health goals 
can be impacted; and (3) exploitation of TRIPS flexibilities to cement bargaining power 
with foreign firms.  As important as these broad principles, however, is to ensure that the 
BRIC transnational intellectual property posture is no longer an ad hoc process, but the 
result of serious academic and political deliberation to achieve a truly balanced 
perspective.  The deliberation must entail an understanding of what flexibilities are 
necessary, ensuring they are adequately preserved, and providing strong intellectual 
property protection in all other circumstances. 
¶58 As a first step toward solidifying this model, the BRIC countries must engage in 
serious investigation to determine what kind of cost-cutting will actually further the goals 
of public health.  If the desire is to increase access, lower prices do not always guarantee 
more users.  For example, when Brazil introduced its generic pharmaceutical regime in 
1999, the expectation was that lower-priced generics would necessarily filter down to 
populations that could not previously afford the medications.200  But data demonstrates 
that this often did not occur, with prescription rates after the introduction of generics 
remaining stable.201  In reality, the same population simply switched to lower-priced 
drugs, shifting the income away from branded pharmaceutical companies but leaving 
access essentially the same.202  Utilizing a TRIPS flexibility to serve a public health goal 
should include the understanding of whether the population lacking the drug is without 
access for reasons other than simple economics. 
¶59 Second, the BRICs must work to ensure that intellectual property flexibilities 
remain.  Perhaps the greatest threat to the BRIC’s desire to maintain control over the 
intellectual property balance is the use of so-called “TRIPS-plus” trade agreements by 
 
200 Generic Drugs in Brazil Are a Hard Pill for Big Pharma to Swallow, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, 
Mar. 10, 2006,  http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1338. 
201 Id. (“[W]e are selling exactly the same volume we sold before generics [came on the market]. What 
happened was that middle-class buyers bought generic products instead of branded products.”) (quoting 
Jorge Raimundo, president of Interfarma, a Brazilian association representing global pharmaceutical 
companies). 
202 Id. 
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industrialized countries.203  In such agreements, a developing nation agrees to give up 
some of the flexibilities it has under TRIPS in order to gain some other trade 
advantages.204  While it would be somewhat paternalistic to suggest that the BRIC 
nations should not have the ability to determine what form of agreement best serves their 
interests, it is fair to say that TRIPS-plus provisions reduce the ability to address future 
uncertainties.  The full consequences of the agreement may not be available to either 
party for many years.  This is likely one reason that the European Union has recently 
indicated that it will no longer seek TRIPS-plus provisions in trade agreements.205  It 
appears that it would be wise for BRIC nations to avoid them as well, and consider 
whether an alternative arrangement could provide the same advantages.  For example, to 
the extent that TRIPS-plus provisions are inserted under the threat of reduced foreign 
direct investment, the impact may be blunted or avoided by collective action on the part 
of developing countries to make use of TRIPS flexibilities.  206
III. CONCLUSION 
¶60 Although much has been written about the BRICs separately, especially India and 
China, there is little scholarship examining the BRIC nations as an emerging collective.  
The influence of the BRICs shall likely be felt on a variety of ways, including political, 
military, and socio-cultural effects.  One arena where controversy and conflict is 
inevitable is in the defense of administration of intellectual property rights, the topic of 
this symposium. 
¶61 In spite of having diverse histories, the BRIC economies are receiving roughly 
similar treatment from the wealthiest nations.  Either through coercion or negotiation, the 
BRICs are being pressured to adopt a Western concept of intellectual property protection.  
That means formal titling of inventive works, enforcement through statutory regimes, and 
the inevitable demand for even greater protection as the diffusion of technology enables 
cheaper and more effective methods of pirating products. 
¶62 These pressures come at a price.  Like many nations in the developing world, 
citizens of the BRIC economies are badly in need of medicines invented and sold by the 
very multi-national organizations pressing for strong protection.  Whereas restrictions on 
cell phone technology or Harry Potter books are rarely fatal, controls of any sort on anti-
retroviral drugs and other medicines can cost thousands of lives.  The debate over 
 
203 Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in RTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006); Carsten Fink & Patrick 
Reichenmiller, Tightening TRIPS: The Intellectual Property Provisions of Recent US Free Trade 
Agreements (2005), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/trade/worldbank02072005.pdf.
204 Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 323, 392-400 (2004) (discussing the move to bilateral trade agreements as a response to 
resistance to multilateralism).
205 European Parliament Press Release, More Measures Needed on Access to Medicines Says EP 
Resolution (Jul. 7, 2007), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/026-9059-190-07-28-
903-20070710IPR09047-09-07-2007-2007-false/default_en.htm (“The resolution calls on the Council to 
restrict the mandate to the Commission in order not to negotiate pharmaceutical-related TRIPS-plus 
provisions affecting public health and access to medicines . …”). 
206 See generally, Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign 
Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming, 2008) (on file with 
authors). 
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pharmaceutical protections has thus become the touchstone for broader economic and 
social issues that divide the developing from the developed nations. 
¶63 The BRIC nations may not be the poorest countries in the world, but can plausibly 
act as their proxy in the world stage.  Brazilian shaping of global public opinion muted 
U.S. pressure to more stringently enforce patent rights and no doubt other nations will 
follow Brazil’s lead.  China and Russia show how economic and political power 
respectively can change the negotiating posture of the United States.  Skillful procedural 
wrangling by Indian legislators shows how very long it takes for coercive pressure to 
actually have an impact on improving national codes.  The result is the BRICs have all 
found their own way in preserving at least some legal sovereignty in the intellectual 
property arena.  These paths, taken together, may provide a model for other middle-
developed countries that hope a better balance between intellectual property rights and 
national economic and social interests. 
¶64 It seems almost too obvious to state that Western interests will have to work with 
and not brush aside the wishes of BRIC nations in shaping a global intellectual property 
regime.  The public demand for and the psychological satisfaction of public coercion will 
not easily fade, and it is only matter of time before the United States or the European 
Union becomes embroiled in another adversarial controversy over patents, trademarks, or 
copyrights.  The accuracy of the predictions of Goldman Sachs will be the ultimate 
measure of whether the BRICs emerge as a robust economic force or remain emerging 
players by the year 2050. 
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